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Abstract— This paper describes a system for performing
handwritten signature verification using complementary sta-
tistical models. The system analyses both the static features
of a signature (e.g., shape, slant, size), and its dynamic fea-
tures (e.g., velocity, pen-tip pressure, timing) to form a judg-
ment about the signer’s identity. This approach’s novelty
lies in combining output from existing Neural Network and
Hidden Markov Model based signature verification systems
to improve the robustness of any specific approach used
alone. The system performs reasonably well and achieves
an overall error rate of 2.1% in the best case. The results of
several other experiments are also presented including using
less reference signatures, allowing multiple signing attempts,
zero-effort forgery attempts, providing visual feedback, and
signing a password rather than a signature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Handwritten Signature Verification (HSV) is a comput-
erised method for verifying a person’s identity by exam-
ining the characteristics of, and the manner in which s/he
signs his/her signature. HSV is considered more natural
and less intrusive than other forms of biometric verifica-
tion such as finger printing and retinal scanning. Static
HSV systems observe the general form of a signature
looking at characteristics such as shape, size and slant.
Dynamic HSV systems measure features specific to the
way the person signs his/her name in real time including
pen-tip pressure, velocity, duration, etc. The main goals
for a HSV system are to reduce the False Acceptance Rate
(FAR) – the number of forgeries accepted as genuine;
and also to reduce the False Rejection Rate (FRR) –
the number of genuine signatures that are rejected as
forgeries. The Overall Error Rate (OER) = FAR + FRR.
Statistical models such as the Neural Network (NN) and
Hidden Markov Model (HMM) naturally lend themselves
to be used as classifiers for HSV systems. Previous papers
have dealt specifically with these two complementary
approaches to HSV (see [21], [22]). For example, the
NN approach from McCabe et al [21] is based largely
on the analysis of global features of the handwriting,
whereas the Hidden Markov Model (HMM) approach
from McCabe and Trevathan [22] examines the local
aspects. However, there has been limited research into
the process of combining, or “fusing”, the two methods
in order to improve the robustness and performance into
a single, powerful HSV system.
Fusion of multiple classifiers is a sub-field of biomet-
rics research that has recently gained in popularity. There
are a number of advantages to be gained by combining
the output of multiple biometric systems:
• Improved performance: If the underlying systems are
complementary and the fusion is done well, the per-
formance of the resulting system will be better than
that of the constituent systems. This is analogous to
consulting a group of experts and making a decision
based on multiple opinions, rather than consulting
just one expert, and is the primary advantage of
combining classifiers;
• Increased universality: The resulting system is gener-
ally applicable in more situations. This comes about
because if one classifier is confused, a decision may
still be made using the other(s);
• Compromises: Use of multiple systems introduces
the possibility of “compromises” if the classifiers
disagree. For example, offering restricted access if
one of the classifiers verifies a signature and the
remainder do not.
The problem of fusing the output of multiple verifiers
is not a simple one and is subject largely to the properties
of the constituent systems. It is not valid to assume that
the combination will always improve performance, for
example it is known that a strong system is better used
alone than in combination with a weak one [8]. The under-
lying classifiers should be complementary and redundancy
between classifiers may actually degrade accuracy [24].
This paper describes a system for performing HSV The
system analyses both the static and dynamic features of a
signature to form a judgment about the signer’s identity.
This approach’s novelty lies in combining output from ex-
isting NN and HMM based signature verification systems
[21], [22] to improve the robustness of any specific ap-
proach used alone. The system performs reasonably well
and achieves a 2.1% OER in the best case. The results
of several other experiments are also presented including
using less reference signatures, allowing multiple signing
attempts, zero-effort forgery attempts, providing visual
feedback, and signing a password rather than a signature.
It is worth noting that the two classifiers being com-
bined in this paper are complementary in terms of the
type of data captured (local versus global) and in terms of
misclassifications. Many of the misclassifications by the
individual systems occur on different signatures suggest-
ing that the models capture some independent information
that may be exploited.
This paper is organised as follows: Section II examines
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previous work into the combination of multiple handwrit-
ten signature classification algorithms. Section III presents
the methodology and the experimentation performed by
combining the models described in [21], [22]. Section IV
presents some further results of interest obtained through-
out testing of this final system. Section V provides some
concluding remarks.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
There are limited studies into the combination of mul-
tiple handwritten signature classification algorithms. The
discussion in this section is centred around methods of
classifier combination, or fusion, applied to biometrics
other than handwritten signatures.
There are three phases in which classifiers can be
combined: the feature extraction phase, the confidence
phase and the decision phase [29]. The feature extraction
phase generally involves the use of multiple sensors and
is not relevant to this paper. The confidence phase is
where most of the following discussion is based and
involves combining the actual confidence values output
by each of the classifiers. The decision phase involves
combining the binary accept/reject decisions of each of
the classifiers, and approaches dealing with this phase are
also considered below.
One of the better designed and developed systems in
the HSV literature is an approach combining both local
and global information in multiple models [18]. Twenty-
three global features were used in the study including total
duration, pen-down ratio and velocity and acceleration
details. The global feature comparison is done through
the Euclidean distance metric applied between the feature
vector extracted from the test signature and the reference
(a vector of mean feature values taken from six sample
signatures).
The local feature comparison is much more complex
in that HMMs were used to compare feature vectors. Six
sample signatures are used to train the HMM to model
the user’s signature as a series of states with probabilistic
transitions between them. Given a test signature, the
Viterbi algorithm [27], [36] is used to search for the most
likely state sequence corresponding to the given observa-
tion sequence and give the accumulated likelihood score
along the best path. That is, the algorithm obtained the
likelihood that the test signature can be modelled by the
HMM of the particular user. The difference between this
score and the mean likelihood obtained during training is
then used as an error measure to classify a test signature
as valid or a forgery.
The authors combine the output of the global feature
comparisons made using the Euclidean distance metric
and the local comparisons using the HMM. Weights were
associated with each technique and the two were com-
bined using another Euclidean method by computing their
root mean-square weighted combination. The authors only
attempted a naive combination using equal weights. The
global feature comparison (4.5% Equal Error Rate 1
1EER is the point at which the FAR and FRR are of equal value.
(EER)) had a better error rate that the local approach
(about 5% EER) and the combination method improved
the result to a 2.5% EER. This reduction in error rate
is brought about due to the complementary information
being captured by the two different models.
A number of interesting concepts are introduced in
[1], [2] The main aspect of interest is the method by
which the authors combined NNs and HMMs into a
single handwriting recognition system. Specifically, they
use a NN that spots and recognises characters and a
HMM to interpret the network output by taking word-
level constraints into account. The NN and the HMM are
jointly trained to minimise an error measure defined at the
word level. The HMM models the long-range sequential
structure while the NN classifies characters using local
spatial structure.
The NN used is a Multi-Layer Convolutional Neural
Network [6], [7], which is a feed-forward NN designed to
minimise the sensitivity to image transformations (trans-
lation, rotation etc.). The network training is done using
the back-propagation algorithm. Three-state HMMs with
left-right transitions are used and the NN outputs observed
for each character. The observation graph was obtained by
connecting these character HMMs.
A later, independent system also attempted to combine
the advantages of NNs and HMMs for handwriting recog-
nition (see [28]). The approach was based on the use
of a NN to model probability density functions. More
specifically, the authors replaced the K-Means vector
quantizations in a discrete HMM by a NN trained using
the maximum mutual information principle (see [23]).
This hybrid system was shown experimentally to outper-
form regular discrete HMMs in this environment, slightly
increasing maximum recognition rates from 94.6% to
95.0%.
Another study appears in [37] where the authors tried
to fuse N decisions made about the author of handwriting
samples. This method of fusion differs slightly from
others reported in the literature in that it involves fusing
the decisions made by the same classifier on a series of N
words, known to be produced by the same author (what is
not known is whether the author is a forger). That is, each
word is verified separately and a probability is generated
representing the level of belief that the writing sample
is genuine. These N decisions are then fused to make
one final decision. A one-dimensional feature vector is
derived from each word to make individual assessments of
authorship, and a modified randomised Neyman-Pearson
test (a method of combining multiple simple hypotheses
with individual likelihoods) is used to fuse the separate
decisions. Using three words, the results were improved
from the one-word non-fusion system error rate of 10%
to 1.45% using the fused decisions.
One of the problems with the previous study is the
assumption that the decisions made on each word are
independent, which in general is not true for several
words written by the same individual. Further studies on
decision fusion for writer identification were performed
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by the same group with a slightly different approach [38].
These individual decisions are fused using the Bahadur-
Lazarsfeld expansion, which is a method of incorporating
multiple probabilistic confidences where independence
is not assumed. As in the previous work, the writer
identification was carried out using the words of a short
sentence with each word being processed separately and
used to verify the author of the writing. The average OER
is again improved over the individual error rates.
The work in [25] explores cooperation of multiple clas-
sifiers for character recognition in an attempt to combine
two independent nearest-neighbour systems, one off-line
and one on-line. The advantage of using both data types
is that the on-line data are richer, as they supply temporal
information, but more heterogeneous too as the same
character can be made of a variable number of strokes
that may be differently ordered (defining many character
allographs). Sixty-two different character classes are used
with more than 75,000 examples in the dataset, although
the style of the handwriting (cursive, hand printed or
mixed) is not described. The authors use naive weighting,
cascading architecture and neural strategies. The weight-
ing and cascading architecture approaches both resulted
in a 30% relative improvement over the most successful
individual (dynamic) system and the neural approach
(which involved using a Multi Layer Perceptron (MLP))
returned a 50% relative improvement.
More recent work in fusion of handwriting recognition
systems appears in [35]. The authors compared four dif-
ferent combination algorithms (Borda count and Choquet
integral from [12] and majority rule and averaging from
[34]) with their own approach called modified Borda
count. They use these approaches to fuse three handwrit-
ing recognition techniques that use different segmentation
and NN algorithms.
When trying to recognise a single written string, con-
ventional Borda count for a word in a lexicon (a dictionary
of words the system is trying to recognise) is defined as
the sum of the number of words with lower recognition
scores in the different lexicons produced by the various
techniques. A higher value for Borda count indicates
a stronger belief that a particular word is correct. The
problem with conventional Borda count is that it doesn’t
take into account the confidence values produced by
the various techniques (only the rankings). The authors
modify this in [35] by essentially summing the product
of the ranking and confidence for each technique. It is also
possible to assign a weighting to each technique based on
the observed recognition accuracy for that approach.
The testing of the individual and combined techniques
was performed using cursive handwritten words taken
from the CEDAR database [15]. The most successful
of the individual techniques resulted in a recognition
rate of 88%. When using the optimal weight values for
the modified approach (calculated via brute force) the
recognition rate improves to 91%.
It is possible to apply the modified Borda count ap-
proach to the HSV problem, but it would be computation-
ally expensive (prohibitively so). It would be necessary to
obtain verification scores for each signer in the database
every time a signature is verified (the equivalent of per-
forming signature identification rather than verification).
This is impractical for a signature database of any realistic
size.
The most popular area for fusion of multiple classifiers
is that of multibiometrics, where the output values from
multiple biometrics-based systems are combined to give a
single result [3], [16], [29]. Systems that combine multiple
different biometrics are very difficult for a forger to
compromise. However, it is generally accepted that com-
bining multiple representations and matching algorithms
for the same biometric signal (the approach described in
Section III) is the most cost-effective and convenient way
of improving biometric performance [24].
The authors in [29] and [30] consider three separate
approaches to combining information at the confidence
level and report on the results obtained. Attempts are
made at combining the output of three separate biomet-
ric verification systems in face verification, fingerprint
verification and hand geometry verification. The three
approaches considered are the sum rule, decision trees
and linear discriminant functions. Fifty users contributed
nine face images, nine fingerprint impressions (of the
same finger) and hand geometry data. The best individual
biometric is found to be fingerprinting at an 11% OER.
The sum rule approach involves taking the weighted
sum of the individual output values from each classifier.
The authors applied equal weight values to each combi-
nation of inputs. Experimentation found consideration of
two biometrics to be more successful than any individual
biometric, and all three to be more successful than any
two. This method resulted in a 1.78% FRR and a 0.03%
FAR.
Decision trees are structures that take a set of properties
as input, and through a process of discrete decision mak-
ing arrive at a binary output (see [31]). The authors used
the well known software C5.0 [26] to generate a decision
tree from a training set of over 11,000 “imposters” and
225 genuine subjects. The result of this was a 9.6% FRR
and a 0.04% FAR.
The final method investigated was the linear dis-
criminant function approach. This involved transforming
the three-dimensional output vectors (one dimension for
each classifier) into a new subspace and maximizing the
between-class separation. The results using this approach
were better than for decision trees but worse than the sum
rule.
[16] extended the above system by augmenting the sum
rule to take into account user-specific classification thresh-
olds and weights for individual classifiers. Two methods
of obtaining user-specific parameters are investigated. The
first method involves assigning equal weights to each
biometric (face, hand and fingerprint) and obtaining a new
score as the sum of these weighted outputs. User-specific
thresholds are then found using the cumulative histogram
of imposter scores for each of the three biometric traits
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for each user. The second method involves estimating
user-specific weights by exhaustive search and using a
common matching threshold. The authors found that their
most successful approach consisted of using common
thresholds, but user-specific weights for each classifier.
Error rates are reduced by up to 3% of the overall error
using this method.
Linear discriminant analysis was also explored in
[10], along with linear methods and NNs as means of
combining confidence measures in a speech recognition
system. The specific application area was a command-
and-control style system and the confidence measures
were generated using HMMs. A database of 3,345 feature
vectors (roughly half allocated to training and half to
testing) was used, with the vectors including five different
confidence measures computed from word hypotheses.
The smallest error rate for speaker-independent classifi-
cation using any of the individual confidence measures
was 9.8%. Using linear discriminant analysis this was
improved to 9.0% and further improved to 8.4% using a
one-layer perceptron to combine the confidences. Slightly
more substantial improvements were reported using data-
dependent confidence measures. The authors also found
that use of a non-linear network (one hidden layer) trained
using the back-propagation algorithm did not generalise
as well as the linear network.
The above findings with respect to the sum rule’s
superiority over other forms of related fusion techniques
are supported in [19] where several similar approaches
are explored. These are further verified independently in
[20] in an approach used for fingerprint analysis (another
popular target area for fusion research). The authors also
extended the approach to examine the product rule, which
involved multiplying the weighted output values from
each of two classifiers. The product rule is reported to
significantly improve the performance over the best single
algorithm (approximately halving the error rate), however,
there was no direct comparison with the results using the
sum rule.
The authors in [17] used a logistic transform to in-
tegrate the output values from three different fingerprint
matching algorithms into a single overall score. Given the
discrete probability distribution functions obtained from
each classifier, the author’s algorithm computes the set of
tunable parameters of the combination classifier for a set
of specified FARs. Testing of the combination algorithm
was done using fingerprint images captured from 167
subjects (the first 83 subjects were used to train the system
and the remainder were used in testing). Small reductions
in the OERs were reported under ideal circumstances, but
nothing that justified the extra overhead.
This approach is augmented by a scheme proposed
in [24] involving the fusion of four different fingerprint
matching algorithms. A large amount of theory is also pre-
sented for selecting the most appropriate classifier (based
on the “independence” of classifiers). However, there are
often limitations to the availability of effective systems
(e.g., there are very few easily available, effective HSV
algorithms). The experimental database consisted of 2,672
impressions taken from 167 subjects (four impressions
of each of four fingers), however, 100 impressions were
later removed from the database due to “rejection” by the
matching algorithm or due to poor quality images.
Combinations of pairs of classifiers are made by esti-
mating two dimensional genuine and imposter densities
from the training data. The optimal setup was found to
be the combination of the three most accurate individual
algorithms (excluding the fourth and least accurate), and
the authors claim a 3% overall improvement. However,
the weakness with this approach for HSV is that a
large amount of training data is required to obtain useful
estimates (of the order of several thousand), along with
forgery data.
Complex Bayesian sampling approaches to the decision
fusion problem have been proposed in a small number
of papers (see [4]). These approaches are more suited
to higher dimensionality situations involving more classi-
fiers, and also have a very high computational complexity
less appropriate for HSV.
Finally, a similar approach to that described in this
paper is presented in [11]. The authors examine a method
for combining the output of HMMs and NNs. The
HMM system models a signature using a feature vector
consisting of seventeen parameters (eight dynamic and
nine static) including velocity, pressure, pen-tilt and some
spatial characteristics. The authors use a single discrete,
left-right HMM for each user and train the models using
fifteen genuine signatures. The HMM technique results in
a 6.30% OER.
The NN used is a MLP featuring twenty-six inputs
(one for each extracted feature), a hidden layer with five
units and two sigmoidal outputs (one representing genuine
signatures and the other forgeries). The MLP is used to
model the global parameters of the signature and includes
aspects such as the number of strokes, signature length
and a number of velocity, angular and directional features.
Training is done using fifteen genuine signatures and one
random forgery from each of fifteen other users in the
database. The MLP here is used mainly to combat the
high FRR exhibited by the HMM, and far less effort is
put into the MLP development.
Fusion of the NN and MLP scores is done using an
approach known as a Support Vector Machine (SVM),
which is a non-linear classification algorithm based on
risk minimisation. The authors selected this technique due
to its suitability to small training sets. The input to the
SVM is the normalized log-likelihood computed by the
HMM, smoothed by a sigmoidal function, along with one
of the outputs of the MLP (the output that represents the
confidence that the signature is genuine). The SVM tries
to insert a “decision frontier” into the feature space to
separate the confidence scores of genuine signatures and
forgeries (the forgeries used are the same as those used
in the MLP training). The SVM tries to maximize the
“margin” between the separator hyperplane and the data.
The final result of the fusion is an improvement from a
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Fig. 1. The combination of models described in previous papers.
previous best case of 6.30% to 5.32% OER.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section presents the methodology and the experi-
mentation performed in the combination of the models
described in [21], [22]. The combination of the two
classifiers essentially involves the development of a whole
new classifier that has two input values: the confidence
value output by the NN system and the normalized log-
likelihood output by the HMM system. Figure 1 illustrates
the basic approach.
A. Experimental Setup
The signature database used in experimentation is de-
scribed in [21]. The type of the two input values differs
in that the value provided from the NN is a confidence
measure and the HMM value is a probability. However,
the domains of the input values are similar in that they are
both in the zero-to-one range with the same interpretation:
a low score implies a low degree of confidence that a
given signature is genuine, while a high score implies a
high degree of confidence. What follows is a description
of the different methods of combining the two models,
grouped according to category.
1) Voting Schemes: These are the simplest methods
of combining the HMM and NN output and involve
the combination being performed at the decision level.
The only input taken in from the two models is the
binary decision rather than the confidence values. With
two different classifiers as input there are two meaningful
schemes or verification scenarios than can be employed:
1) Unanimous acceptance: This means that the com-
bined classifier should accept a test signature only
if both constituent classifiers accept it. Put another
way, the test signature should be rejected if either
system classifies it as non-genuine. The ideal effect
of this is that fewer forgeries will be accepted (as it
is less likely that they will deceive both classifiers)
without rejecting many more genuine signatures
(as well-performed genuine signatures should be
accepted by both classifiers). Table I presents the
results obtained using this approach, which include
the FAR, FRR and OER.
2) Disputed acceptance: This setup results in a signa-
ture being accepted if it is accepted by either classi-
fier (or both). Ideally, forgeries are still rejected (as
both of the constituent classifiers are quite adept
at detecting forgeries) while slightly lower quality
signatures from genuine users are still accepted
(as they may still contain enough characteristic
Acceptance Mechanism FAR FRR OER
Unanimous 0.9% 2.1% 3.0%
Disputed 2.2% 1.6% 3.8%
TABLE I
The results using the two different voting mechanisms to combine the
classifiers.
information to be accepted by at least one of the
classifiers). The results obtained using this approach
are also presented in Table I. Unanimous rejection
by both classifiers should obviously result in the
signature being rejected.
When discussing the results presented in Table I it
is useful to recall that the best OERs for our NN [21]
and HMM [22] systems are 3.3% and 3.5% respectively.
Relative to the individual system error rates the “Unani-
mous Acceptance” results were an improvement over the
most successful individual system, whereas the “Disputed
Acceptance” approach actually degraded the overall per-
formance. As expected, the unanimous approach resulted
in a much lower FAR as it was far more difficult for
a forgery to deceive both classifiers. Fortunately, there
was not a greatly adverse affect on the FRR, which
meant the OER was improved. The disputed approach
results in the FRR slightly improving, however, the FAR
increases substantially and the OER suffers as a result.
Inspection of the rejected genuine signatures offers an
explanation for the lack of significant improvement in the
FRR in that these signatures are either poorly written or
differed greatly from the signatures given as a reference
for that user. As a result they tend to be rejected by both
classifiers.
However, the results above do not give a definitive
answer as to which acceptance mechanism is most suited
to combining HSV systems. The approach to use depends
largely on the environment in which the signatures will
typically be provided. If the environment is casual as in
a general purpose system, it is likely that the test signa-
tures will be of slightly lower quality and the disputed
approach is more forgiving and more appropriate. If the
environment is a formal, high security one, then the added
security of the unanimous approach is likely to result in
more desirable performance. It is believed that the formal
environment in which the handwritten signature database
was captured contributed to the unanimous approaches
superior performance.
A voting mechanism may also be used in granting
different levels of access depending on the level of
signature acceptance. That is, if both classifiers reject the
test signature then no access is granted, if both accept
the test signature then full access is granted or if the
classifiers are in disagreement then partial or restricted
access is granted.
2) Confidence-based Approaches: This section dis-
cusses the various techniques used to combine the confi-
dence outputs from each of the classifiers. All explored
methods and resulting error rates are presented below.
• Weighted sum: The weighted sum rule (sometimes
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referred to as simply the sum rule) involves taking
the weighted sum of the individual scores from
the classifiers to achieve the overall score for the
combined system:
Scombined =WNN · SNN +WHMM · SHMM
where Scombined is the final score for the combined
model, WNN and SNN are the weight and score
for the NN model and WHMM and SHMM are the
weight and score for the HMM. The score values
from each of the models are obtained independently
and are a measure of the confidence that each model
has in the test signature being genuine.
The weight and threshold values are the same for
every user and are obtained in a joint training phase.
This phase involves an exhaustive search that tests
all weight values in the range [0,1] (with increments
of 0.01) for each classifier, with the constraint that
the sum of the weights is always 1. The combined
scores are obtained for each weight combination
and compared to a threshold. The test signature is
accepted if the score is above this threshold and
rejected otherwise. The threshold value and weight
pairing that gave the lowest global (i.e., over all
users in the database) OER are used for all further
experiments. These values are 0.42 for the threshold
and 0.62 and 0.38 for the HMM and NN weights
respectively.
This approach worked quite well and improved the
OER to 2.7% (1.5% FAR and 1.2% FRR).
• Product rule: The product rule is quite similar to the
sum rule and involves taking the weighted product
of classifier scores:
Scombined =WNN .SNN ×WHMM .SHMM
Weight values and thresholds are obtained in the
same way as they were for the sum rule approach.
The product rule represents the joint probability
distribution of the values extracted by the classifiers.
This approach produces very similar results to that
of the sum rule and obtained a 2.8% OER (1.3%
FAR and 1.5% FRR).
• Mean transformation: The mean transformation is
essentially a special case of the weighted sum with
the weights set to 0.5 and is used in [20] to combine
classifiers for fingerprint verification. This transfor-
mation simply takes the mean of the two classifier
scores for a test signature:
Scombined =
SNN + SHMM
2
The mean approach did not perform well in this
instance, returning an overall error rate of 3.9%
(1.8% FAR and 2.1% FRR), which is worse than
both individual classifiers.
• Decision trees: Results were obtained using the C5.0
program [26] to generate a decision tree from a
training set of classifier score pairs. Five genuine
Fig. 2. The MLP structure that produced the lowest OER when
combining the constituent systems. Each of the weight values Wi is
optimised via a learning algorithm.
score pairs were used as a reference and the score
pairs from genuine signatures of twenty-five other
users in the database were used as negative examples
(the twenty-five users were selected in a similar
way to training forgeries selected in [21]). The data
seemed to be insufficient for accurate construction of
decision trees and C5.0 did not perform well using
only five genuine references, resulting in a 8.4%
OER (5.5% FAR and 2.9% FRR).
• Multi-layer perceptrons: Multi-layer Perceptrons
(MLPs) are used in [21] to build one of the
constituent HSV systems. It was theorised that a
non-linear classifier such as a MLP may be able
to achieve better classification by capturing a more
insightful relationship between the two confidence
measures. The basic model structure consists of a
three-layer network with two input units and one out-
put unit. The back-propagation algorithm was used to
train the model and experimentation was done with
different numbers of nodes in the hidden layer, but
the most successful structure found contained two
hidden nodes. Figure 2 illustrates the structure (refer
to [21], [22] for specific information regarding the
type of activation functions used).
The makeup of the training set (in terms of positive
and negative examples) was identical to that used for
the decision tree approach described previously. The
MLP’s performance over the training set was very
good but did not generalise as well to the test set,
most probably because of the small amount of input
data. The OER using this approach was 3.0% (1.3%
FAR and 1.7% FRR).
• User-specific weighted sum: This is the most success-
ful of the approaches to combining model scores.
The method here is similar to that used in the
“weighted sum” approach, modified to apply to
individual users. The basic algorithm for adjusting
the user-specific weights is as follows:
1) For user i, vary weights WNN,i and WHMM,i
over the range [0,1] (with increments of 0.01)
with the constraint that WNN,i +WHMM,i
equals 1;
2) The overall score used for verification is then:
Si =WNN,i × SNN,i +WHMM,i × SHMM,i
3) Si is compared to a user-specific threshold Ti
for each user and the test signatures is accepted
if Si > Ti and rejected otherwise;
4) Choose the set of weights and thresholds that
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Combination Method FAR FRR OER
Product rule 1.3% 1.5% 2.8%
Mean transformation 1.8% 2.1% 3.9%
Decision trees 5.5% 2.9% 8.4%
Multi-layer perceptrons 1.3% 1.7% 3.0%
Weighted sum 1.5% 1.2% 2.7%
User-specific weighted sum 1.1% 1.0% 2.1%
TABLE II
The resulting error rates using the different confidence-based approaches
to combining the classifiers.
minimises the total error rate associated with
the overall scores.
Here WNN,i refers to the user-specific weight asso-
ciated with the NN output for user i and WHMM,i
refers to the user-specific weight associated with the
HMM output for user i. Similarly SNN,i refers to the
score (i.e., output or confidence) from user i’s NN
and SHMM,i the score from user i’s HMM. Si refers
to the overall score value for user i. The total error
rate referred to in step 3 of the algorithm (not to be
confused with the overall error rate) is the sum of the
individual error rates calculated during the training
phase. Details of the weight and threshold selection
appear below.
The overall score Si is obtained for each weight
combination in the range [0,1] (with increments
of 0.01), with the constraint that the sum of the
weights is always 1. In an extended training phase,
error rates are calculated using the original reference
signatures as genuine attempts (i.e., the training
and testing databases remain separate) and a set of
thirty-five forgeries (obtained from the other users
in the database in the same manner as described in
[21]). These error rates are calculated by exhaustive
experimentation with threshold values, varying the
threshold in the range [0,1] (with increments of 0.01)
for each weight pairing. The threshold and weight
values triple that produces the lowest OER is then
fixed for that user. Often a range of weight values
results in an OER of zero for a particular user - in
this case the median of each weight range is used.
Similarly, the median threshold is used when there
is a range of threshold values resulting in the equal
lowest error rate.
OERs for each user are then calculated using the
fixed weight and threshold values with the previously
unseen genuine signatures and skilled forgeries being
used as test signatures. This approach improved
the OER to 2.1% (1.1% FAR and 1.0% FRR) and
returned an EER of 1.1%. All error rates quoted in
following sections will be based on this user-specific
weighted sum approach unless otherwise specified.
Table II summarises the results of all of the confidence-
based methods of combination.
A summary of all of the developmental models appears
in Table III, including the NN alone, the HMM alone,
both models combined via the weighted sum rule and
Model FAR FRR OER
Neural network 1.1% 2.2% 3.3%
Hidden Markov model 1.2% 2.3% 3.5%
Weighted sum 1.5% 1.2% 2.7%
User-specific weighted sum 1.1% 1.0% 2.1%
TABLE III
The most successful results for each of the different model scenarios
used during development. The weighted sum is shown for comparative
purposes.
both models combined via the user-specific weighted sum
approach. As can be seen, the combination of models
resulted in an increased performance over both individual
models, with the user-specific weighted sum approach
being most successful.
It is generally believed that MLP will outperform this
method if enough training examples are used. However, in
this paper we wish to base the MLP as a comparison for
the user-specific weighted sum approach using the same
set of test data. For this reason, we have not tested the
MLP using more training data to verify this.
IV. FURTHER RESULTS
The lowest error rate obtained for any system described
in this paper (the “User-specific weighted sum” version of
the combined network) produced an OER of 2.1% when
tested over the entire database. This section presents some
further results of interest obtained throughout testing of
this final system.
A. Removal of “Short Signatures”
Any methodology that includes the removal of “un-
suitable” signatures from a database is dubious, but is
done here for comparative purposes. Other researchers
(e.g., [9]) have examined this aspect, purely for the sake
of interest not through any attempt to artificially reduce
the reported error rates of their systems. Short signatures
(those with a duration less than some time t) are going
to contain less information and be more variable than
signatures of more significant length. Due to this lack
of consistent information content it is more difficult to
verify genuine short signatures and more difficult to reject
attempted forgeries of these. As such, although these
signatures constitute a small percentage of the database,
they have a disproportionately large affect on the error
rates. It can be argued that removing these signatures from
the database gives a fairer description of the accuracy of
the system in question.
Figure 3 shows the breakdown of average signature
duration for each user sorted in order of ascending du-
ration. Figure 4 shows the error rates that result from
excluding all signers whose average signature duration
is less than t seconds. As can be seen from the figure, as
more short signatures are removed, the error rate tends to
reduce proportionally. A similar study in [9] found that
the error rate was almost halved when a duration limit of
1.25 seconds was set. The error rate for the user-specific
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Fig. 3. The average signature duration (in seconds) per signer.
Fig. 4. The OER versus the duration threshold. Signers with an average
signature duration less than t seconds were removed from consideration.
Error rates generally improve as signature duration increases.
weighted sum system reduces from 2.1% to 1.6% using
this same limit (which excludes a total of seven users
from consideration).
B. Contribution to Overall Error
For various reasons it is typical for a small proportion
of signers to be responsible for a large proportion of
the error rate. Reasons for this include small signature
duration as discussed in the previous section, unusually
large variation in signature style or in extreme cases
signers may have more than one version of their signature
(as was the case with one signer in the database used
throughout this paper). These types of users are always
going to be present in a large-scale realistic database, so
it is not valid to exclude these users from calculations of
error rate. However, it is insightful to examine individual
user’s contributions to the OER.
Figure 5 is a plot of these individual contributions and
illustrates that the majority of the error is contributed by
a minority of the users. The entire error is contributed
by eleven users, over 35% of the error is contributed
by two users and over 45% is contributed by three. The
verification is perfect for over 90% of the users (the exact
weight and threshold values selected for these users is
less important as small variations had no effect on the
verification error rates).
C. Allowing Users Another Chance When Rejected
This approach has been taken by other authors in the
literature [13], [32] and is perhaps a realistic approach
Fig. 5. A plot of individual contributions to OER, sorted in order of
increasing contribution.
to how HSV systems would function in a general usage
scenario. If a test signature is rejected by the particu-
lar HSV system, then this approach allows the signer
to attempt verification again (typically a maximum of
three attempts). This would be acceptable in a situation
where more importance is placed on lowering the FRR
and lessening the inconvenience to genuine users, rather
than the emphasis being placed on security. Less false
rejections will occur through this method, however, there
will most likely be an increase in false acceptances.
Experiments conducted to evaluate the success of this
kind of approach involve firstly training the system, then
presenting test signatures to the system for each user (as
with other testing approaches). The difference here is that
if the test signature fails, the following signature is tested,
and a third if the second also fails. Acceptance is deemed
to occur as soon as one of the test signatures is verified,
but if all three signatures fail the test signer is rejected.
As expected, the FRR is improved dramatically using this
approach to 0.1% with FAR suffering, rising to 1.5%.
There are a number of modifications that can be made
in this sort of system, such as only allowing users to re-
try if one of the constituent classifiers verifies the test
signature.
D. Varying the Size of the Reference Set
All results discussed so far involve the use of just
five reference signatures. Many systems presented in the
literature require more than five samples (typically ten)
in order to build a reference (e.g., [5], [33]). Using more
reference signatures will most likely lead to lower error
rates as it allows further information to be extracted and
more effective models to be built. The cost of using more
reference signatures is extra computation, extra memory
storage, greater inconvenience to users and the risk of
them getting frustrated and refusing to use the system
at all. There is also an issue with fatigue if a user is
required to provide too many signatures in one sitting
and a resulting loss of reference signature quality.
Experiments were conducted using more than five
reference signatures in order to facilitate a more accurate
comparison with other systems in the literature that use
more sample signatures to build a reference. Table IV
JOURNAL OF COMPUTERS, VOL. 4, NO. 7, JULY 2009 677
© 2009 ACADEMY PUBLISHER
Reference Set Size FAR FRR OER
5 1.1% 1.0% 2.1%
8 1.0% 0.8% 1.8%
10 0.8% 0.8% 1.6%
TABLE IV
A breakdown of the error rates for various reference set sizes, optimised
to give the lowest OER.
Fig. 6. The OER versus the number of reference signatures used.
and Figure 6 show the affect of increasing the number
of reference signatures on error rates.
Note that there are approaches that can be used to
obtain larger reference sets without the inconvenience.
One example is to take five reference signatures during the
enrolment phase and adding any later verified signatures
to the reference set and re-training the models. The
obvious disadvantage with this kind of approach is that if
a forgery is incorrectly verified then it will be added to
the reference set, corrupting the model.
E. Zero-Effort FAR
The Zero-Effort FAR (ZEFAR) has been discussed
in previous papers [21], [22] and is a measure of the
“confusion” the system exhibits or the likelihood that a
forger with no knowledge of the genuine signature will
provide a successful forgery. ZEFAR is quoted in many
HSV articles in the literature and is a useful measure as it
illustrates the class separation obtained by the developed
system. It is also useful as most successful forgeries
in general signature verification environments are either
zero-effort forgeries or are very poor attempts.
To arrive at a figure for ZEFAR, all signatures (genuine
and provided forgeries) from other users in the database
are used as test signatures. This means that there are
3,850 (approximately 35 signatures from each of the 110
other users) zero-effort forgeries for each user, totaling
over 430,000 for the entire database. When testing the
trained system, a total of 388 of these test signatures were
accepted as genuine, resulting in a 0.09% ZEFAR.
Note that no re-training occurred specifically for these
tests, and weight and threshold values were the same as
those used in the “User-specific weighted sum” approach.
F. The Importance of Visual Feedback When Signing
As part of the HSV system development a number of
experiments were conducted to assess the importance of
Fig. 7. (a) A signature sample captured using a stylus to provide visual
feedback to the signer. (b) A signature sample from the same author
captured without the use of the stylus.
visual feedback when performing a signature. It is gen-
erally accepted that the movements controlling signature
production are stored in some kind of muscle or nerve
“memory”. Further, once a signature has been practiced
sufficiently the nerve impulses are controlled by the brain
without any particular attention to detail [14].
Three experiments are conducted using the final version
of the HSV system in an attempt to lend support to
the hypothesis that no visual feedback is required when
signing. The experiments involve thirty of the signers
from the original database contributing a set of five
signatures using a stylus that provided them with visual
feedback as they wrote (i.e., it reproduced the pen-tip
path). Visually, the stylus-based signatures appear very
similar to the regular (produced without the aid of the
stylus) signatures with one signer producing identical
durations in two cases. An example of a more elaborate
signature can be seen in Figure 7 where part (a) shows
the signature sample captured using a stylus and part (b)
shows a sample captured without the use of a stylus.
The first experiment involved using the stylus-based
signatures to train the models. The genuine signatures
previously provided by the signer (without the use of
the stylus) were used as test signatures along with the
previously provided forgeries (fifteen genuine signatures
and five forgeries were available for testing). If the
hypothesis is correct then the error rates, particularly the
FRR, should be approximately the same as when there
was no stylus used to produce the reference signatures.
Without the use of the stylus in training the OER for these
thirty users is 2.4% (1.1% FAR and 1.3% FRR). When
the stylus is used the FAR remains the same and a single
extra false rejection is recorded, resulting in an OER of
2.7% (1.1% FAR and 1.6% FRR).
The second experiment used the regular signatures
(produced without the use of the stylus) to train the sys-
tem and attempted to verify the stylus-based signatures.
The FRR in this case was just 0.7% with only one of
the stylus-based signatures being incorrectly classified.
The FAR using this training mechanism is reported in
Section III-A as 1.1%, giving an OER of 1.8% (note
that the set of genuine signatures is much smaller in this
experiment).
The final experiment used a mixture of the two types
of genuine signatures to train the system (three regular
and two stylus-based). The results using this setup were
identical to when no stylus-based signatures were used,
at 2.4% OER (1.1% FAR and 1.3% FRR).
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This series of tests strongly supports the hypothesis
that visual feedback is not required when reproducing
practiced writings, particularly signatures.
G. Manually Adjusted Personal Thresholds
This section involves manual inspection of the class
separation for comparative purposes. The “User-specific
weighted sum” version of the system attempts to take
into account personal weights and thresholds to maximise
the verification accuracy. The approach worked quite well
in most instances, however, it is very difficult to do
this accurately with such a small training set. Manual
calculations can be made to determine the ideal weight
and threshold values and the resulting error rate. This
error rate represents the maximum accuracy that can
be achieved using the two models with this data. In
other words, the optimal class separation obtained by
the HSV system on the given data set. The OER when
manually selecting the optimal weights and thresholds is
0.47% (0.16% FAR and 0.31% FRR). The system fails to
achieve complete (manual) class separation on just four
signatures, generated by just two signers.
H. Signing a Password
One of the issues with HSV is that an individual’s
signature is generally not secret (not in the same sense
that a password or personal identification number is).
A potential forger may be able to obtain a copy of a
genuine signature and then has the opportunity to practice
(although error rates have proven to be quite good even
for practiced forgeries).
In an attempt to build a variant of the HSV system
that was not subject to these problems, experiments were
conducted where users “signed” a password instead of
their signature. Signing a password takes advantage of
multiple security schemes in that a potential forger not
only has to know (or guess) the user’s password, but also
has to be able to reproduce the structure and style of the
genuine writing.
The first stage of the process involved forty-seven users
being instructed to think of a password (one they could
easily remember) and practice the writing over a period
of one to two weeks until they felt comfortable with the
writing style. The writers then provided five samples of
their signed password (there was no stylus used here as to
do so would have the undesirable effect of leaving a visual
artifact that a potential forger can copy) on three separate
occasions, totaling fifteen genuine samples per user (five
of which were used in training). Three types of forgeries
were gathered based on information that the forger was
provided. The first type of forgery was produced by the
forger where they were not given the password to be
forged, so had to guess. With the second type, the forger
was told the password but was not given access to the
writing style. The third type of forgery involved the forger
being told the password and being given a sample of the
writer’s natural style, but no sample of the actual written
Forgery Type FAR FRR OER
No information 0.0% 0.6% 0.6%
Told password 0.0% 0.6% 0.6%
Told password,
given general sample 0.9% 0.6% 1.5%
TABLE V
The resulting error rates using different types of forgeries in the “signing
passwords” variant of the HSV system.
password was given. Five of each type of forgery were
gathered for each user in the database.
Table V presents the error rates using the three differ-
ent forgery types. The approach works quite well with
no false acceptances when the forger didn’t know the
password or when the forger had no access to sample
handwriting. In most cases the genuine users wrote their
passwords with some originality or flair (making it very
difficult to forge if this style is unknown). Conversely,
forgers would sometimes try to fool the verification
system by drawing straight lines or squiggles when the
password was unknown.
This would be a useful general purpose standalone
security system in many situations, for example in grant-
ing access to a personal computer containing sensitive
information. The cost of the additional hardware is min-
imal and the gain in the level of security is quite high.
Personal data organisers or hand-held computers with a
pen interface would also be potential environments that
could benefit from this type of approach.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes a system for performing HSV
using complementary statistical models. The system anal-
yses both the static features of a signature (e.g., shape,
slant, size), and its dynamic features (e.g., velocity, pen-
tip pressure, timing) to form a judgment about the signer’s
identity. This approach’s novelty lies in combining out-
put from existing Neural Network and Hidden Markov
Model based signature verification systems to improve
the robustness of any specific approach used alone. The
system performs reasonably well and achieves a 2.1%
OER in the best case. The results of several other exper-
iments are also presented including using less reference
signatures, allowing multiple signing attempts, zero-effort
forgery attempts, providing visual feedback, and signing
a password rather than a signature.
Because of the nature of handwritten signatures and
the fact that some users vary between signature versions,
flawless classification is the unachievable goal of HSV
systems. Performance is already far in advance of human
capabilities. The process of comparison between different
HSV systems is made very difficult as a result of the
different signature databases used. The presence and
quality of forgeries as well as the method in which they
were obtained is a useful indicator of database quality.
The forgeries captured for this study were performed after
the forgers had viewed sample signatures being produced
so that the forgeries are of high quality. Given the quality
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and size of the database, the verification results achieved
are excellent when compared to similar research.
Future work involves the analysis of the independence
of the two classifiers used in this study (and indeed the
fusion classifier in general). The methodologies described
in our previous papers [21], [22] present demonstrably
different classifiers, both in terms of input features and
learning/classification techniques. Further work would in-
clude a detailed investigation as to the style of signatures
that are correctly classified by both individual systems,
and the tradeoff between individual classifier accuracy
and independence of classifiers. In addition, it would be
intuitive to investigate how the radial basis function per-
forms against the multilayer perceptron structure in terms
of reducing training complexity in HSV applications.
As noted in Section III-A, we have not tried to opti-
mise the performance of the MLP approach using more
training. An area for future research is to determine the
comparative offerings when a larger training set is used
for the MLP, and if and when the MLP surpasses the
user-specific weighted sum approach for HSV.
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